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to Investigate Economic Concepts: 
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 Michiru  Nagatsu 
 Introduction 
 Philosophers of science discuss not only general epistemological and 
metaphysical questions about explanation, causation, evidence, and the like, 
but also conceptual questions concerning the nature of scientifi c concepts such 
as genes, culture, and rationality. One might expect less disagreements in the 
latter debates, since the philosophical analyses are presumably based on the 
same “best scientifi c theories” available at the moment. Th e disagreements over 
the exact nature of these scientifi c concepts, however, seem sometimes more 
fundamental than those over, for example, what constitute a good explanation. 
One might argue that this is healthy because a naturalistic philosophy of science 
should refl ect genuine disputes in scientifi c practice. But such dissonance 
among scientists may be exacerbated by philosophical commentaries, because 
philosophers of science typically rely on diff erent evidence bases in an 
unsystematic way: some consult their intuitions, others fi rst-hand experience as 
practitioners in the relevant scientifi c discipline, and yet others a small number 
of case studies of research articles. Although a narrow focus on a particular type 
of evidence can deepen our understanding of some aspects of scientifi c practice, 
if uncoordinated, it fails to provide a big picture of the scientifi c conceptual 
landscape ( Weinberg and Crowley, 2009 ). Even worse, it may provide a distorted 
image of science. 
 Experimental philosophy (X-phi) of science is a relatively new approach 
that aims to overcome this problem. Specifi cally, it uses survey-experimental 
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instruments to generate data about scientists’ judgments on conceptual issues, 
in a hypotheses-oriented and controlled fashion, thereby complementing or 
confronting the kinds of evidence mentioned here regarding how scientists 
understand and use particular concepts ( Griffi  ths and Stotz, 2008 ;  Machery, 
2016 ). Until very recently, experimental philosophy has not been much applied 
in the philosophy of science, despite its popularity in other fi elds of philosophy. 1 
X-phi is even less popular in philosophy of economics, compared to other 
scientifi c fi elds (e.g.,  Stotz, 2009 ;  Linquist et al., 2011 ;  Knobe and Samuels, 2013 ). 
I think this is just a contingent fact, and there is no deep reason that prevents 
an experimental approach from being useful in the philosophy of economics. I 
argued elsewhere that this unfortunate situation should change ( Nagatsu, 2013 ) 
and conducted one of the fi rst consciously X-phi of economics studies ( Nagatsu 
and P õ der, 2018 ). Drawing on these results, I will argue that an X-phi approach 
can indeed bring conceptual clarity to some debates in philosophy of economics. 
 Another related fi eld is worth a brief mention before discussing X-phi of 
economics. Philosophical questions concerning economics include not only 
methodological and conceptual ones about economics as a science, but also 
theoretical and normative ones within economics, such as the nature of justice, 
welfare, norms, and conventions. Th is fi eld overlaps with philosophy both in 
content and in style, being highly theoretical, abstract, sometimes formal, and 
with little empirical input other than theorists’ intuitions. Th e rise of experimental 
and behavioral economics, however, changed this situation, just like X-phi has 
changed philosophy, and it has become increasingly popular to study these issues 
using experimental games of bargaining, coordination, and social dilemmas. I 
call this fi eld  experimental economics of philosophy to distinguish it from X-phi 
of economics, and to highlight the fact that its method comes from experimental 
economics, while the subject matter is of philosophical interest. Although it is in 
practice diffi  cult to draw a distinct line between this and the rest of experimental 
economics, one can identify several studies with explicitly philosophical focus 
on, for example, justice ( Konow, 2003 ), Humean and Lewisian conventions 
( Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden, 1994 ;  Guala and Mittone, 2010 ;  Guala, 2013 ), and 
moral judgments and behavior ( Gold, Colman, and Pulford, 2014 ,  2015 ). Of 
particular interest for X-philes is the use of real monetary incentives, one of the 
methodological features of experimental economics of philosophy that may be 
useful in other X-phi studies as well ( Gold, Pulford, and Colman, 2013 ). 
 Th e chapter is organized as follows: fi rst, I will introduce two working 
hypotheses concerning the variance and validity of scientifi c concepts, 
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conceptual variance, and conceptual ecology hypotheses, which I borrow from 
X-phi of biology and draw on throughout the chapter (“Conceptual variance and 
conceptual ecology”). Th en, I introduce commonsensible realism as the received 
view in philosophy of economics (“Commonsensible realism”). In “Choice 
concepts: Folk vs. economic,” I discuss folk vs. economic concepts of choice, 
drawing on my own study. In “Preference concepts: Behavioral, psychological, 
or constructive?” I discuss behavioral vs. mental interpretations of preferences 
that divide economists and psychologists. Th e penultimate section (“Tracking 
changing methodological practice: To nudge or not to nudge?”) discusses how 
X-phi can shed light on conceptual ecology in addition to conceptual variance. 
A brief conclusion follows (“Conclusion”). 
 Conceptual variance and conceptual ecology 
 Th e early studies in X-phi of science (in particular  Griffi  ths and Stotz, 2008 ) 
provide a useful framework for the empirical-conceptual investigation of 
economic science. Th is framework consists of two working hypotheses: 
conceptual variance and conceptual ecology. Th e conceptual variance 
hypothesis states that a given concept may have diff erent meanings across 
diff erent scientifi c communities; the conceptual ecology hypothesis states that 
there are oft en methodological reasons, both epistemic and practical, for such 
variance. More generally, scientists adapt cognitive resources, such as models, 
concepts, and other techniques to their own specifi c problem-solving domains 
to facilitate their cognitive and practical goals. Th is adaptation, or  epistemic 
niche construction ( Sterelny, 2010 ), gives rise to domain specifi city ( MacLeod, 
2016 ) of scientifi c practices. Conceptual variance can be understood as a 
manifestation of this domain specifi city in scientifi c concepts, refl ecting 
conceptual ecology. 
 In general, three types of conceptual variance can be distinguished: (i) folk 
vs. scientifi c variance, (ii) interdisciplinary variance, and (iii) intradisciplinary 
variance. Th e fi rst concerns variance across lay and expert concepts, while 
the latter two concern variance across scientifi c communities, large and 
small, respectively. “Commonsensible realism” and “Choice concepts: Folk 
vs. economic” discuss (i); “Preference concepts: Behavioral, psychological, or 
constructive?” discusses (ii); and “Tracking changing methodological practice: 
To nudge or not to nudge?” discusses (iii). 
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 Commonsensible realism 
 Traditionally, philosophers of economics have discussed theoretical concepts 
in economics (mostly in the theory of consumer choice) in the context of 
realism. Uskali M ä ki has been one of the proponents of  commonsensible realism , 
according to which the entities and relationships of economic theory are part 
of the “common-sense furniture of the human world” ( M ä ki, 2002b , p. 95). In 
particular, the class of psychological states posited by the theory of consumer 
choice is part of “the ontic furniture of common-sense psychology, which we all 
employ in our daily lives regardless of whether we have an academic degree in 
psychology” ( M ä ki, 2000 , p. 111). Daniel Hausman concurs: the unobservables 
in economics, that is, “beliefs, preferences, and the like are venerable. Th ey 
have been a part of common sense understanding of the world for millennia 
.   .   . there is no principled epistemological divide between the beliefs and desires 
[of] everyday life and the subjective probabilities and utilities of economics” 
( Hausman, 1998 , pp. 197–99). 
 Although the motivations of M ä ki and Hausman are diff erent, they both 
dismiss the relevance of the observable/unobservable distinction to the 
philosophy of economics; unlike in the philosophy of physics, they insist, this 
distinction is unimportant for scientifi c realism debates in economics. M ä ki 
wants to shift  philosophers’ attention away from ontological questions to more 
specifi c, methodological questions regarding the representational strategies of 
economists, such as isolation, abstraction, and idealization, and how to evaluate 
these strategies necessarily involving unrealistic assumptions. Th e key question 
concerns the truth, or “realisticness” of representations, not the existence of 
postulated entities. Although Hausman argues that scientifi c realism, including 
the kind of realism M ä ki sees as central, is largely irrelevant to economic 
methodology, both agree that commonsensible realism provides necessary and 
suffi  cient ontology for economic theory. 
 Contrary to this received view, I argue that commonsensible realism is a 
necessary starting point of economic methodology, but it is not suffi  cient. First of 
all, there is a relevant analogy between realism in physics and economics; although 
unobservable entities like electrons do not fi gure in economics, the exact nature 
of latent constructs have always been controversial. For example, the nature of 
preferences has been extensively debated in the philosophy of economics (see 
“Preference concepts: Behavioral, psychological, or constructive?”). Preferences or 
utility are said to be latent not because they are too small to be seen with the naked 
eye but because they have to be inferred from observable behavior. Despite this 
diff erence, their nontransparent character gives rise to disagreement concerning 
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the conceptual and ontological nature of preferences, just like esoteric concepts 
and entities in physics do. Commonsensible realism, on a strong reading, cannot 
explain why researchers disagree on the nature of preferences—we wouldn’t 
expect such a disagreement if economic constructs are identical with concepts 
which everyone shares from everyday experience. Moreover, commonsensible 
realism lacks a resource to explain patterns of the disagreement—if there is 
any—about the nature of particular economic constructs. I show some evidence 
against the strong reading of commonsensible realism, and propose its weaker 
version as an alternative conceptual variance hypothesis in “Choice concepts: 
Folk vs. economic.” Commonsensible realism needs to be qualifi ed by accepting 
economic concepts’ systematic departures from folk counterparts. 
 It is worth emphasizing at this stage that X-phi of economics is distinguished 
from general surveys on the opinions of economists and other members of the 
general public. A well-known study demonstrated the systematic gap between folk 
and economists’ opinions about the economy. Th is is a series of telephone surveys 
of 1,511 noneconomists and 250 economists conducted by the Washington Post/
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University Survey Project ( Blendon 
et al., 1997 ). Th e main fi ndings of this study include a systematic gap between 
economists’ and lay people’s reasoning about how the economy works. For 
example, lay people tend to see increased prices as a result of companies’ price 
manipulation, while economists tend to see it as due to supply and demand. Th is 
and other fi ndings reveal a systematic divergence between folk and economic 
theories of how the economy operates. But studies of this type cannot directly 
inform debates on commonsensible realism, because all the evidence shows is 
that lay people have their own folk-economic theory, which may be underscored 
by the common-sense concepts shared by the folk and economists. In order to 
investigate possible conceptual variance between folk and economists, a study 
needs to be designed to focus on concepts, not just opinions. 
 Choice concepts: Folk vs. economic 
 Ross (2011 , p. 220) raises a thought-provoking challenge to commonsensible 
realism, speculating that those economists who are psychology or neuroscience 
skeptics “have a diff erent concept of choice in mind” than that shared by 
noneconomists. Th is is surprising, because choice is not even latent or 
unobservable in the sense that preferences or beliefs are. Moreover, unlike these 
concepts that are formally defi ned in choice theory, the concept of choice itself 
is rarely explicitly characterized in the textbooks, as if people shared a common 
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understanding of its meaning. 2 But if Ross is right, that is, if these economists 
have a concept of choice diff erent from the one held by noneconomists, 
commonsensible realism needs to be qualifi ed. Th is has practical implications, 
too. Regarding the gap between the folk and economic theories of the economy 
mentioned above, for instance, the gap might be more diffi  cult to bridge than 
initially thought if the two groups diverge even at the supposedly commonsensical 
conceptual level. 
 Specifi cally, Ross states that choice is a pattern of behavior that varies in 
response to incentives. We highlight two points: fi rst, on this view, choice in 
economics is a population-scale phenomenon, rather than an individual 
psychological one. Th is implies that choice can have very heterogeneous 
causal bases if one zooms in to the individual scale, such as eff ortful decision-
making, imitation, inertia, constrained random behavior, and so on. Second, 
since these causal bases are heterogeneous, the subject may or may not be 
conscious that she is making a choice. Consciousness is thus not a necessary 
(nor a suffi  cient) condition for behavior to count as choice in this economic 
sense. Nevertheless, choice has to vary in response to shift s in incentives in a 
theoretically tractable way. 
 Ross’s conceptual variance hypotheses can be reformulated as follows: 
 ●  H1: Economists are more likely than noneconomists to think of a behavioral 
change as choice, if it is a response to incentive shift s. 
 ●  H2: Economists are more likely than noneconomists to think of a behavioral 
change as choice, even if the actor is not aware that she is responding to 
incentive shift s. 
 In order to test these hypotheses by eliciting the respondents’ notions of choice, 
we constructed two sets of  vignettes , that is, stylized descriptions of hypothetical 
scenarios in which the protagonist changes his or her behavior prompted by 
a range of events ( Nagatsu and P õ der, 2018 ). We tested the two hypotheses in 
two diff erent sets of vignettes. In the fi rst set, we manipulated the dimension 
concerning the cause of the protagonist’s behavioral change (Linda’s reduce meat 
consumption). We had four levels, namely, (i) belief change, (ii) price change, (iii) 
medical change, and (iv) “nudged” change. In the second set, we manipulated 
the dimension concerning the protagonist’s awareness of the cause of their own 
behavioral change (John stops winking to his female colleagues), where the 
cause is fi xed as an incentive change (frowns of disapproval by winkees). We had 
three levels, namely, (i) being aware of the cause, (ii) being unaware of it, and 
(iii) interrupted by a cause overdetermining behavior regardless of awareness. 
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Th e order of the two sets were fi xed, but the order of the vignettes within each 
set was randomized for diff erent subjects. 
 We constructed two separate sets of vignettes (seven in total) instead of twelve 
by manipulating the two dimensions in 4  × 3 factorial design. 3 Th e main reason 
for this choice is that some levels in the two dimensions are not independent and 
create implausible vignette cases. 4 Th us we tested two dimensions, one at a time, 
in two separate sets of vignettes: the fi rst set investigated the connection between 
the notion of choice and types of cause of behavioral change; the second set of 
vignettes investigated the connection between the notion of choice and what 
mediates behavioral change. At the end of each vignette, subjects were asked 
to agree or disagree to the statement: “Linda chose to eat less meat” and “John 
chose to stop winking,” respectively, on a 7-point Likert scale. 
 We disseminated the online survey using Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Th e 
link to the survey was disseminated using mailing lists at diff erent universities in 
fi ve countries: the United Kingdom (University of Reading), Finland (University 
of Helsinki, Hanken School of Economics), Estonia (Tallinn University of 
Technology), Italy (University of Milan), and Turkey (Bahcesehir University). 
Th e survey was also sent to the students who were enrolled in the course 
Understanding Economic Models (Fall semester 2016) at the Department of 
Political and Economic Studies, the University of Helsinki, before the course 
had started. Of the 185 respondents who started, 127 completed the survey 
(completion rate was 69 percent; mean time for completion was 8 minutes). We 
did not give incentives in money or course grade. Th e main part of the survey 
was followed by demographic questions, including the main area of study, the 
level of education (BA, MA, and PhD), mother tongue, and gender, as well as a 
prompt to leave any comments on the survey in free form. Th e characteristics of 
the respondents are summarized in  Table 7.1 . We operationalized “economists” 
as those who selected “Economics” as the main area of study. “Business and 
Management” is distinguished from “Economics.” 
 To summarize, we have two predictions: 
 ●  Prediction 1: other things being equal, economists (defi ned by their Main 
Area of Study) are more likely than noneconomists to agree to the statement 
“Linda chose to eat less meat” in the price change scenario but not in the 
others. 
 ●  Prediction 2: other things being equal, economists (defi ned by their Main 
Area of Study) are more likely than noneconomists to agree to the statement 
“John chose to stop winking” in the unconscious scenario but not in the 
others. 
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 Table 7.1  Respondents’ characteristics 
 Area of study  Education  Language  Gender 
 Economics  73  BA  34  English  16  Male  79 
 Others  54  MA  25  Estonian  16  Female  48 
 PhD  63  Finnish  34 
 n/a  5  Italian  23 
 Turkish  17 
 Others  21 
 Total  127  127  127  127 
 Our regression analysis is largely consistent with our predictions and support 
Ross’s hypotheses. In particular, answering “Economics” as the main area of 
study makes one more likely to judge Linda’s incentive-induced behavioral 
change as a choice. Th is eff ect, call it the  economist eff ect , is large (about 20 
percent average marginal eff ects), statistically signifi cant (p  < 0.05), and 
robust (the eff ect size remains the same regardless of the exact thresholds 
for responses to be categorized as positive or negative answer), confi rming 
Prediction 1. Th e results strongly suggest that economists are more likely than 
noneconomists to think of a behavioral change as choice if it is a response to 
incentive shift s. Th is supports Ross’s hypothesis 1, as formulated above. Th e 
economist eff ect on judging John’s unconscious incentive-induced behavioral 
change as choice is not as clear, and therefore we focus on the fi rst economist 
eff ect here. 5 
 Economists might have a distinctive, technical concept of choice that they 
apply in their scientifi c practice, but how do we know that the economist 
eff ect we observed refl ect that methodologically relevant concept? Th e 
answer we advance is a specifi c version of commonsensible realism. Unlike 
the strong version, which identifi es economic and folk concepts, this weak 
version accepts that economic concepts such as choice (and subjective beliefs, 
preferences, and the like) are continuous with common-sense counterparts 
but deviate from them in ways that refl ect economic theoretical frameworks, 
such as the theory of choice. In other words, economists share some common-
sense understanding of these concepts, which is overridden or partially 
modifi ed by scientifi c disciplinary training (or alternatively purifi ed by self-
selective recruitment). While the strong version does not motivate empirical 
investigations of economic concepts (because we already know them from our 
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everyday experience), the weak version motivates such investigations and also 
off ers a plausible explanation of our observations that economists’ concept of 
choice is aff ected by their theoretical frameworks. 
 Th e crucial questions are what constitutes the core “commonsensible” part 
of the choice concept, and what makes the economic concept of choice deviate 
from it. We hypothesized voluntariness as the core commonsensible of choice. 
Common sense tells economists (as well as noneconomists) that choice has to be 
voluntarily made—otherwise, you have no choice! In this sense, Linda’s reduced 
meat consumption due to the increase in meat prices is less of a choice because 
of the limits imposed on a range of available options, thereby compromising the 
voluntary nature of her reduced meat consumption. According to the standard 
economic framework, however, choices simply refl ect or “reveal” the subject’s 
satisfaction of exogenous (i.e., given) preferences under certain constraints. In 
this framework, Linda’s reduced meat consumption in response to price increase 
is a choice because her behavioral change still satisfi es her preferences under a 
new, tighter budget constraint. Th is speculation provides a plausible mechanistic 
explanation of the economist eff ect we observed in the Linda vignette: while 
noneconomists interpreted the increase in prices as reducing the voluntary 
nature of Linda’s response, economists did not, because their theory-laden 
concept of choice told them that it was irrelevant. Some might have explicitly 
thought: “Linda could have maintained the same level of meat consumption, 
by, for example, buying less clothes.” To sum up, this study suggests that 
commonsensible realism in the strong sense needs to be abandoned, while 
its weaker version is a plausible cognitive hypothesis regarding how and why 
economists’ concept deviates from their folk counterpart. In the next section, 
I turn to the  preference concept, whose nature has been disputed between 
economics and psychology. 
 Preference concepts: Behavioral, 
psychological, or constructive? 
 Th e notions of preferences and utility are among the most contested ones in 
the history and philosophy of economics. Historians of economic thought have 
discussed the development of these notions from the nineteenth to the twentieth 
century before World War II ( Moscati, 2013 ;  Lewin, 1996 ;  Hands, 2012 ). More 
recently, the rise of behavioral economics and neuroeconomics revived this 
debate. While the discussion of commonsensible realism in “Choice concepts: 
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Folk vs. economic” concerns the variance between folk and scientifi c (economic) 
concepts, these debates on preferences explicitly concern variance of preference 
concepts in two scientifi c disciplines: economics and psychology. Roughly 
speaking, the debates take place in the context where psychology challenges 
economics for its lack of psychological realism. In this section, I will provide a 
brief overview of these debates and discuss how X-phi of economics can shed 
light on them. 
 Th e postwar development of revealed preference theory enabled economists 
to model choice behavior as utility maximization based on observable 
choice data and a set of parsimonious axioms regarding preference relations. 
Accordingly, the hedonic connotation of the utility concept—intensity of 
pleasures and pains—has been stripped away, and it has become simply a 
convenient way of indexing preferences that satisfy the axioms of revealed 
preference theory. Th ere is a popular historical narrative among economists 
according to which this theoretical achievement is seen as a completion of 
the long-term separation of economics from psychological hedonism, under 
the infl uence of the contemporary behaviorism in the early twentieth century. 
 Edwards (2016) calls it a “behaviorist myth”; however, this interpretation is 
misleading. First, strictly speaking, the notion of preferences never disappeared 
from choice theory, as originally envisioned by the young Paul Samuelson, the 
founder of revealed preference theory ( Hands, 2010 ). Second, the core axioms of 
the theory (completeness and transitivity of preferences) are postulated  a priori , 
not based on observations of human behavior using behaviorist methods such as 
conditioning. Th ird, Expected Utility Th eory ( Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
2004 , fi rst appeared in the second edition in 1947)—the standard theory of 
choice under risk and uncertainty—did not develop along the behaviorist line, 
either. Th is theory involves the notion of risk preference as a key construct, and 
 Savage (1954) added an extra psychological construct of beliefs qua subjective 
probabilities. So, as a historical account, the behaviorist myth is just that, a myth. 
However, the myth may refl ect an inherently ambivalent nature of the notion 
of preference in economics: on the one hand, the theory enables economists to 
infer (or  reveal , as they say) preferences from observed choice data without data 
on mental or neurological processes. In this sense, the preference concept does 
not need psychology. On the other hand, the very axioms are based on a priori 
postulates about preference relations (and relations between subjective beliefs 
and preferences in the case of expected utility theory), which seem to be based 
on the introspective psychology of decision-making. Are preferences behavioral 
or psychological (mental)? 
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 As noted earlier, the debates over this question have been intensifi ed by 
the rise of behavioral economics in the last quarter of the twentieth century 
and neuroeconomics in the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century. Behavioral 
economics, mostly infl uenced by cognitive psychology, has demonstrated 
numerous empirical anomalies to expected utility theory and game theory; 
some neuroeconomists even go further and suggest that the very notion of 
preferences may have to be abandoned given the data from new neuroimaging 
techniques such as fMRI ( Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005 ). In response 
to the increasing pressure to revise mainstream economic theories based on 
these new types of data,  Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) argued that psychological 
and neurophysiological evidence is simply irrelevant to the economic theory 
of choice because the theory does not refer to mental states and therefore 
is “mindless.”  Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) initiated the neuroeconomics 
controversy among economists and methodologists. (For a very careful and 
thorough methodological analysis, see the target article  Harrison, 2008 , as 
well as the commentaries in the same issue). Just like the behaviorist myth, 
the controversy is a symptom of a deep disagreement between psychological 
(mental) and behavioral interpretations of preferences. 
 To focus on conceptual issues, I turn to philosophers of economics who try 
to explicitly defi ne what preferences are.  Hausman (2012) provides one of the 
clearest conceptual analyses of preferences, according to which preferences in 
economics are total subjective comparative evaluations. 6 Th at is, they capture the 
agent’s subjective rankings of available but competing alternatives aft er taking 
into account all relevant pro tanto reasons, which, jointly with her beliefs, cause 
(and justify and explain) her choice of one alternative over the other(s). So if 
Anne has two feasible evening plans, b (going to a friend’s barbecue party) and 
c (going to the cinema), and prefers c to b, and if her beliefs do not interrupt 
with this preference (e.g., by reminding her that the cinema is closed today), 
she will and should choose c over b, because her preference (c  > b) has been 
formed by considering all the subjective factors that are relevant to her decision-
making.  Angner (2018) rejects Hausman’s interpretation of preferences, based 
on the evidence that such mentalistic commitment on the part of economists 
cannot be found in (i) orthodox economics textbooks, (ii) commentaries by 
founding economists of the postwar neoclassical synthesis, or (iii) contemporary 
economists’ practices. 7 
 Angner’s case against the mentalistic interpretation of the preference concept 
may seem to sway the balance between mental vs. behavioral interpretations 
toward the latter. In fact, however,  Angner (2018) proposes the dissolution of the 
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dichotomy by proposing a minimalist interpretation: preferences in economics 
are whatever the axioms of utility theory say they are. According to Angner, the 
preference concept is “implicitly defi ned” by virtue of its place in the axioms of 
choice theory and therefore has no intrinsic, defi nite meaning. Th is contextual 
view implies, fi rst, that preference concept’s defi nition can (implicitly) change 
as some axioms are modifi ed; and second, even taking all the axioms as fi xed, 
the empirical meaning of preferences may change depending on the domain to 
which the theory is applied by some correspondence rules. 
 Guala ( 2017 ) also denies the dichotomy between mental vs. behavioral 
interpretations of preferences and proposes a third interpretation, according 
to which preferences are dispositions with multiply realizable causal bases. 8 
Th is view is not behavioral because preferences may have mental causal 
bases. For example, a consumer’s intransitive preference over three cars with 
three attributes may be caused by her use of a simple heuristic for pairwise 
comparisons: choose one that beats the other on most attributes. However, the 
view is not mentalistic, either, because preferences may have nonmental causal 
bases. For example, a three-member committee’s intransitive preference over 
three candidates (a choice problem formally equivalent to the last example) is 
caused by institutional rules: majority voting through a sequence of pairwise 
comparisons of the candidates. In both cases, preferences are dispositions that 
explain choice that have multiply realizable causal bases, such as mental rules of 
thumb and institutional rules of aggregation. 
 Guala’s example of the intransitive preferences of the consumer and the 
committee can be seen as an elaboration on the second implication of Angner’s 
contextual account of preferences; that is, the meaning of preferences depends 
on the domain of application of choice theory. More generally, Guala identifi es 
three conditions for preference-based choice theories to be explanatory of an 
agent’s behavior: the agent in question is (1) consequence-driven, (2) motivated 
to pursue diff erent goals, and (3) able to compare the value of such goals. Note 
that these conditions themselves should not be given mentalistic interpretations. 
So predicates such as “is driven by,” “is motivated to,” and “is able to compare” 
are all applicable to nonhuman agents (neurons, bees, pigeons, etc.) and agents 
composed of human agents (committees, nation states, etc.), as well as to human 
agents with limited cognitive capacities (infants and boundedly rational people 
like us). In fact, conditions (2) and (3) come from the axioms concerning how 
preferences are ordered, for example, b  ≽ c or c  ≼ b, and condition (1) comes 
from a particular correspondence rule used to infer preferences from observable 
behavior. We do not know  a priori which agents’ behavior fi ts the bill, and this 
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seems to be the point at which philosophers have to hand the matter over to 
scientists. 
 Taken together, these two accounts of preferences in economics—Angner’s 
Nagenlian contextual account and Guala’s Fodorian multiple realizability 
account—off er a convincing argument to the eff ect that there is no defi nite 
answer to the question “are preferences mental (psychological) or behavioral?” 
Th ere is nothing in the nature of preferences as such that can determine the 
answer, because it depends on how the axioms of choice theory implicitly defi ne 
preference relations, and which domains the theory can be successfully applied 
to. 
 So if there is no philosophical disputes to be adjudicated here, what roles 
are left  to X-philes of economics? I see at least two important roles of X-phi of 
economics here. First of all, the X-phi approach can show whether there is any 
systematic connection between the folk concept of preferences and its theory-
laden, economic counterpart. Angner ( 2018 , p. 21) suggests that everyday 
connotations of theoretical constructs are simply irrelevant to scientifi c debates, 
citing Nagel’s position that “such connotations are irrelevant .    .    . and are best 
ignored” ( Nagel, 1961 , pp. 91–92). However, this claim will have to be qualifi ed 
if the weak version of commonsensible realism I proposed in “Choice concepts: 
Folk vs. economic” also applies to preferences. Th e folk concept of preferences is 
relevant to the understanding of economic counterpart if the latter’s departures 
from the former are systematic. And in order to know if such a systematic 
connection exists, we need to empirically investigate what the commonsensible 
of preferences is, for which the X-phi approach will be necessary. Moreover, 
the commonsensible of preferences is relevant because preference-based choice 
theory is simultaneously used as a basis of normative welfare evaluations of 
agents when the theory is applied to individual human agents. In this specifi c 
but main domain of applications, then, economists are imposing their implicit 
defi nition of preferences on individuals. And it is not clear why the individuals’ 
own conception of preferences are “best ignored” in this normative context. 
 Second, X-phi can be useful in investigating methodologically relevant 
interdisciplinary diff erences between economics and psychology, which may 
persist even aft er the dichotomy between behaviorism and mentalism has been 
dissolved. To see this, let us restrict the domain of application of choice theory 
to individual humans again. 
 In this domain (including consumer choice theory), the causal basis of 
preferences is most naturally interpreted as mental, as suggested by Guala’s 
( 2017 ) example of heuristic-based intransitive preferences, and also Angner’s 
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(2018) use of fi ndings from cognitive science. Based on “far-reaching similarities” 
( Angner, 2018 , p. 17) between how Hausman and cognitive scientists talk about 
preferences, Angner takes the fi ndings of implicit biases (such as mere exposure 
eff ects) in cognitive science to be the evidence against Hausman’s account of what 
preferences are in economics. Th is move is based on the assumption that what 
preferences are in this domain depends on what cognitive scientists say they are. 
But some economists disagree with even this localized mentalistic interpretation 
of preferences.  Guala (2017) tries to dissolve this tension by suggesting that 
preferences are explanans for economists and explanandum for psychologists, 
that is, that economists explain individual choice based on preferences, which 
are in turn explained in terms of individual mental processes by psychologists. 
 Ross (2014) , however, questions such a neat division of explanatory labor. Th e 
economic concept of preferences, argues Ross, does not map onto individual-
scale mental processes, which are too heterogenous to provide a generalization 
about preferences; nevertheless, statistical analysis of a large number of pooled 
individual choice data can reveal projectible preferences at a market scale. Such 
projectability comes largely from the market structure in which individuals 
are embedded, that is, artifi cial environmental scaff olds such as information-
processing technology and engineered (or emergent) institutional rules. 
Importantly, the market structure is not bounded by the limits of individual 
rationality. Rather, the market structure can be designed (or evolve) precisely 
to transcend the limitations of individual decision-making rationality. Th e 
revealed rational patterns, such as systematic responses to incentives, are thus 
an ecological property of the market, not of any single individuals. 
 Note that Ross’s account of preferences—which is analogous to his account 
of choice discussed in “Choice concepts: Folk vs. economic”—is not strictly 
behavioristic because it leaves room for the psychology of latent individual 
mental processes to play a causal role in market phenomena. 9 What he is resisting 
here is rather the prospect that psychology (or neuroscience for that matter) will 
eventually provide a general theory of what preferences are in economists’ sense, 
supplanting the economic theory of choice. 
 If  Ross (2011) is correct, in the domain of individual choice, economists are 
committed to the concept of preferences that are neither mental nor behavioral, 
but constructive: preferences emerge from the combination of individuals who 
process information internally and the market structures that scaff old their 
decisions and interactions. Th is hypothesis is testable by X-phi approach, and if 
supported by evidence, it may provide a novel explanation of the conservative 
nature of economic practices. For example, somewhat surprisingly, economics 
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education remains more or less the same before and aft er the rise of behavioral 
economics, despite the prestige it has won over the last decades within the 
economics profession and its popularity outside academia. Core economic 
theories (e.g., price theory) have not been modifi ed accordingly. 10 Psychologists 
see this practice as unscientifi c, and economics students fi nd it baffl  ing. 
 Indeed, understanding this conservativeness of economics has been one 
of the leitmotifs in philosophy of economics: (How) can we methodologically 
justify economists’ reliance on psychologically unrealistic models of choice? 
Traditionally, this question has been addressed in the general epistemological 
frameworks such as idealization or ideal types ( Angner, 2015 ), and isolation of 
target systems by models (see  M ä ki, 2002a , part III) or the robustness of such 
unrealistic models. Th ese general frameworks, however, cannot make sense of 
the methodological uniqueness of economics vis- à -vis psychology, for they do 
not explain why economic idealization is diff erent from the kind of idealization 
psychologists engage in. 11 In contrast, Ross’s constructive characterization 
of preferences is based on his analysis of domain-specifi c methodology of 
economics, which general epistemological frameworks cannot penetrate. An 
X-phi study designed to identify economists’ concept of preferences and its 
deviations from the folk and psychological counterparts may demonstrate such 
a domain specifi city of the preference concept, which will motivate more fi ne-
grained methodological discussions. For example, we can start from a survey-
experimental test of Hausman’s 2012 account of preferences in economics as 
total subjective comparative evaluations, which  Angner (2018) criticizes. Each 
dimension of Hausman’s conceptual analysis can be operationalized and examined 
in a relatively straightforward way. A next step will be to test Ross’s account of 
constructive preferences, which will require vignettes that draw directly on real 
economic modeling practices and a larger sample of economists. Such studies 
may demonstrate the domain specifi city of economic methodology in a concrete 
manner, which can help other scientists and economists to better understand 
their methodological diff erences. We also expect the results to be relevant to 
economics pedagogy and the public understanding of economics as a science. 
 Tracking changing methodological practice: 
To nudge or not to nudge? 
 X-phi is a useful approach to discovering systematic variances between folk and 
scientifi c concepts and between psychological and economic concepts. Given 
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the diversity of economics, we should expect that conceptual variance exists even 
within economics. A literature survey by  Cowen (2004) , for example, identifi es 
a few variations of the rationality concept in diff erent fi elds of economics, such 
as consumer choice theory, macroeconomics, experimental economics, and 
game theory. In addition, two cases studies, one on Contemporary Revealed 
Preference Th eory ( Hands, 2011 ) and the other on behavioral economics ( Guala, 
2011 ), suggest rather diff erent understandings of preferences within economics. 
Th e conceptual ecology thesis justifi es such a cohabitation of diff erent concepts 
within science, whether across or within disciplines. However, some philosophers 
may think that X-phi is good at taking a static snapshot of conceptual landscape 
but incapable of analyzing dynamic methodological changes, should they arise 
in the same fi eld. I have two responses, one generic and one specifi c. 
 First, it is uncontroversial that diff erent empirical methods have diff erent 
advantages and limitations, and complement each other. Somewhat simplifying, 
qualitative case studies, including historical analysis, detailed analysis of published 
articles, interviews, and participatory observations, are good at studying 
scientifi c practices in depth; in contrast, X-phi and bibliometrics (systematic 
analysis of published documents) are good at providing breadth, or an overview 
of conceptual landscape and trends and networks, respectively. Of course, X-phi 
is distinct from all other of these methods in being able to manipulate vignettes 
in a systematic, hypothesis-oriented way. But these methods are all needed to 
fully understand scientifi c concepts. To extend the contextual theory of scientifi c 
concepts a bit further, it is not diffi  cult to see that concepts are implicitly defi ned 
not only by theoretical postulates and the rules of correspondence but also by the 
entire web of scientifi c practices, what  Chang (2012) calls a  system of practice . In 
our case of preferences in economics, the relevant practices include institutional 
engineering of market rules, welfare analysis of such policy interventions, and 
the normative individualism that underpins such welfare analysis. Qualitative 
methods are best suited for studying these practices in depth. 12 
 Second, however, X-phi may provide methodologically relevant information 
about dynamic changes in economic methodology and elucidate the nature of 
accompanying disputes, if not dissolve them. In this section, I will use nudge 
paternalism as an illustrative case. 
 Nudges are defi ned as policy interventions in choice architecture—contexts 
in which individual choice takes place—that do not signifi cantly change 
people’s incentives or beliefs but still reliably produce welfare enhancing 
behavioral change ( Th aler and Sunstein, 2008 ). Famous examples include the 
default change of pension choice (from opt-in to opt-out), and the automatic 
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retirement savings mechanism (Save More Tommorrow TM ). Th ese nudges are 
reverse engineered based on various psychological eff ects found by behavioral 
economists, such as loss aversion, framing eff ects, the status quo bias, and the 
present bias. Th ere have been a great deal of debates around nudges among 
philosophers, economists, legal scholars, and policy makers, in particular 
regarding nudges’ potential threats to individual liberty and autonomy and 
their ethical permissibility as a policy instrument. Economists are polarized in 
these debates, some embracing nudges and others rejecting them altogether. 
But it is not clear why and on what grounds they disagree. In particular, is the 
skepticism based on some moral conviction about individual autonomy and 
freedom or more subtle methodological (epistemic and practical) reasons? Th e 
conceptual ecology thesis and X-phi can illuminate the nature of this debate 
from a methodological perspective. 
 First, consider Ross’s conceptual ecology thesis.  Ross (2011) justifi es 
his hypothesized variance between the economic, constructive concept of 
preferences and its psychological, individualistic counterpart, discussed in 
“Preference concepts: Behavioral, psychological, or constructive?” in terms of 
the practical concerns of respective fi elds as follows: psychologists are interested 
in the process of individual valuation and motivation because that is the scale 
on which most psychological interventions take eff ect, whereas economists 
are interested in the population-scale responses to incentive changes because 
that is the scale on which most economic interventions such as subsidies and 
taxes operate. At a very general level, this seems to be a plausible and useful 
characterization of the diff erent epistemic and practical concerns of the two 
disciplines. And this conceptual ecological thesis provides a methodological 
insight into the debates around nudges. 
 Notice that Ross’s ( 2011 ) own defi nition of preference and choice excludes 
nudged behavioral change from economic choice because by defi nition nudges 
are not incentives. However, there are signifi cant conceptual similarities between 
incentives and nudges. First, both aim at population-scale behavioral change by 
indirectly intervening on the environment—constraints and choice architecture, 
respectively—rather than by directly intervening on individuals’ motivations 
or cognition. Second, both are quiet about the exact psychological processes 
underlying behavioral change. Incentives presuppose that choices will respond 
to them, but there is tentative evidence that economists do not consider this 
process to be necessarily conscious, as discussed in “Choice concepts: Folk vs. 
economic” (see footnote 5). One might think that nudges are diff erent because 
behavioral economists study nonstandard preferences caused by psychological 
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biases, but note that many of the psychological eff ects I have listed here are 
experimental eff ects rather than causal mechanisms (see  Guala, 2017 , p. 9). 
Although several plausible psychological mechanisms have been proposed and 
tested in the lab as explanations of these eff ects, nudges are proposed based on 
their reliable eff ects at a population scale, rather than on the exact mechanisms 
that generate them. Th ird, both incentives and nudges presuppose exogenous 
preferences, though in crucially diff erent ways. Incentives aff ect budget 
constraints, taking for granted people’s preferences as given. Similarly, nudges 
change choice architecture, taking for granted people’s preferences that nudges 
allegedly help manifest by removing psychological biases. 
 Given these similarities, it is no surprise that some pragmatic economists 
(e.g.,  Chetty, 2015 ) embrace nudges as part of economists’ toolbox on par 
with incentives in behavioral public policy. In fact, there is not much in Ross’s 
ecological thesis that prevents economists’ adoption of nudges, given the latter’s 
characteristics as (i) population-scale, (ii) mechanism-neutral, (iii) preference-
reserving interventions. What do economists think? An X-phi study can 
examine whether and why economists (and others) accept nudges as legitimate 
policy interventions by systematically manipulating these factors. 
 In the X-phi study discussed in “Choice concepts: Folk vs. economic,” we 
found evidence that economists’ intuition about nudged behavioral change 
is not diff erent from that of noneconomists.  Nagatsu and P õ der (2018) asked 
participants whether Linda’s reduced meat consumption, nudged by the new 
arrangement of cafeteria food displays (another classic example of nudges in 
 Th aler and Sunstein [2008] ), was a choice. Th e mean answer was least positive 
among the four scenarios (4.51 on 1 “Strongly disagree” to 7 “Strongly agree”) and 
not signifi cantly diff erent from noneconomists’ responses (4.07, p(T-test) = 0.12, 
p(Wilcoxon Rank Sum test) = 0.23). Th is case, however, is not informative 
because the scenario was explicitly holding Linda’s preference for meat as fi xed. 
A better scenario should incorporate (iii) by making it explicit that Linda has a 
preference to reduce meat, which a nudge helps to satisfy. Th is way, X-phi can 
investigate not only whether economists accept nudges but also why. 
 So far, philosophers of economics have discussed nudges as ethical problems 
based on their understanding of what preferences are ( Hausman and Welch, 
2010 ;  Bovens, 2009 ). Incidentally, both Hausman and Bovens subscribe to 
the concept of preferences as subjective total evaluations of alternatives, 
which  Angner (2018) rejects as irrelevant to economics. I do not necessarily 
think that such ethical critiques are irrelevant because (a weak version of) 
commonsensible realism provides a link between folk and economic concepts of 
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preferences in the domain of individual choice. But if economists see nudges as 
a population-scale intervention tool, ethical critics will have to justify why their 
ethical standards, based on a philosophical model of practical reasoning, have 
to weigh in economics. Also, philosophers focusing on mechanisms of nudges 
( Heilmann, 2014 ;  Nagatsu, 2015 ;  Gr ü ne-Yanoff , 2016 ) will have to justify why 
mechanisms are important and in what level of details, if economists themselves 
(even behavioral economists) do not fi nd issues of psychological mechanisms 
central for their methodology. We might be barking up the wrong trees. 
 Note that I am not arguing that philosophers of economics should refrain 
from participating in controversial contemporary debates in economics. On 
the contrary, I think that philosophers’ participation can serve many functions 
such as providing conceptual clarifi cation and outsiders’ criticism. At the same 
time, there is a real danger that we philosophers will obscure the real issue by 
smuggling in our own perspectives to the debates, such as practical reasoning 
and mechanistic philosophy of science, in this case. Th e X-phi approach works 
as an antidote because it (i) reminds us of the domain specifi city of economics 
(conceptual ecology), (ii) forces us to formulate hypotheses regarding the 
construction of economic concepts and how they are related to folk and 
other scientifi c concepts (conceptual variance), and (iii) gives us a way to test 
these hypotheses, in combination with evidence from other qualitative and 
nonexperimental studies of economics practices. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have outlined what experimental philosophy of economics is and 
what it can do. It is an survey-experimental approach to illuminate conceptual 
issues in economics, driven by the conceptual variance and conceptual ecology 
as the working hypotheses. I have introduced our own study that suggests that 
economists think of choice in a systematically diff erent way than noneconomists, 
specifi cally as a response to incentive shift s. I have suggested that this result can 
be best understood as a manifestation of the weak version of commonsensible 
realism; that is, the economic concept of choice is linked to the common-sense 
counterpart but departs from it in a systematic way. I have also discussed the 
concept of preferences that are contested between economists and psychologists, 
introducing their behavioral, mental, and constructive interpretations in the 
literature. I suggested that these interpretations are testable and may provide 
a novel understanding of economic methodology revealing its domain 
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specifi city. Finally, I have discussed the recent nudge debates as a case in which 
economists themselves disagree on the proper methodology of economics. 
Building on Ross’s conceptual ecology thesis, I have highlighted three similar 
aspects of incentives (the standard tool of economic intervention) and nudges 
(a new and controversial tool), namely, their population-scale, mechanism-
neutral, preference-reserving characters. We can analyze disagreements among 
economists at a deeper conceptual level by eliciting economists’ responses by 
systematically varying vignettes along these three dimensions. At this stage, 
these ideas are more like thought experiments, with the exception of the real 
study of choice that we have conducted. And even that study has not covered a 
large enough, representative sample of economists. To do so will require more 
forces, so I welcome readers to join me in the exploration of this promising 
conceptual  terra incognita . 
 Notes 
 1 In  PhilPapers experimental philosophy of science does not have its own category; 
instead related papers are scattered across categories such as Foundations of 
Experimental Philosophy, Misc. and Experimental Philosophy, Misc. See https ://ph 
ilpap ers.o rg/br owse/ exper iment al-ph iloso phy. Th e situation is similar on popular 
blogs and edited volumes on X-phi. 
 2 In economics, choice and behavior are oft en used interchangeably, or the term 
 choice behavior is used. 
 3  Griffi  ths, Machery, and Linquist, (2009) for example, used 2  × 2 b × 2 = 8 vignettes. 
More generally, in social research it is common to use more dimensions with more 
levels, resulting in a vast number of vignettes. Such design typically requires more 
subjects and random assignment of these subjects into diff erent subsets of vignettes 
because it is practically impossible to expose each individual to more than a certain 
number of vignettes due to fatigue eff ects. Factorial surveys with this design are 
oft en not driven by clear hypotheses, unlike our case (see  Nock and Guterbock, 
2010 , for a review). 
 4 See Auspurg and Hinz ( 2014 , pp. 40–42) for the problems of implausible and 
illogical vignettes and ways to address them. In our case, (i) belief change and (iii) 
nudged change are respectively associated with conscious and unconscious mental 
processing: the agent is usually conscious about her behavioral change when she 
does so because of a changed belief; in contrast, if one changes behavior because of 
a nudge, oft en the change is not transparent to the agent. Discussions on the ethical 
permissibility of nudge-based behavioral policies revolve around this worry; see 
 Th aler and Sunstein (2008) . 
AQ: Please check 
whether the edit 
in this sentence is 
appropriate.
BLO_07_APS_C007_docbook_new_indd.indd   166 14-05-2019   09:59:19
167 Applying Experimental Philosophy to Investigate Economic Concepts 
 5 Th e eff ect is large (about 18 percent average marginal eff ects) and signifi cant 
(p   <   0.05) but not robust, since the eff ect disappears in a model that is more 
permissive in categorizing responses as positive (this model takes 5, 6, and 7 on 
the 7-Likert scale as the positive answer). We can say that the economist eff ect 
exists only under the assumption that it should be detected in terms of a stronger 
agreement to the statement. Also, models that take levels of education as categorical 
rather than linear do not show the economist eff ect. Th us the second hypothesis—
that economists are more likely than noneconomists to think of a behavioral change 
as choice even if the actor is not aware that she is responding to incentive shift s—is 
supported only under restrictive model assumptions. 
 6 Although Hausman does not cite it,  Bovens (1992) off ered a similar defi nition of 
preferences 20 years before in discussing the rationality of practical reasoning. 
Hausman’s original contribution is to apply this defi nition of preferences to 
economics. 
 7 Angner also refers to empirical fi ndings from cognitive science that show that 
people actually do not form preferences by integrating partial evaluations, and 
evolutionary explanations of why this has been adaptive. 
 8 See also ( Ross, 2011 ). As one can imagine from our discussion in 4, Ross has a very 
similar defi nition of preferences in economics. 
 9 Ross ( 2014 , p. 416) is, however, critical about the empirical success and theoretical 
importance of the most famous model of boundely rational choice, Cumulative 
Prospect Th eory ( Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 ). I cannot discuss this substantial 
scientifi c debate here. 
 10 Some textbooks now have a chapter on behavioral economics, but it is treated more 
like an added topic, rather than a foundation of a complete revision of price theory. 
 11  Kahneman (2011) clearly indicates that psychological models such as the dual-
system models are idealization. 
 12 See  Wagenknecht, Nersessian, and Andersen (2015) for a general discussion of 
qualitative approach in philosophy of science. MacLeod and Nagatsu ( 2016 ,  2018 ) 
demonstrate the value of such methods in studying conditions for successful 
interdisciplinary model-building involving economists and ecologists. 
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